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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Limiting the Use of Standardized Intelli-
gence Tests for Ability Grouping' in Public Schools
Judge Peckham of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California faced a somewhat unusual allegation of de facto
segregation in the case of P. v. Riles.2  The de facto segregation al-
legedly existed not among individual schools of the local school dis-
trict, but among classes within each individual school. Plaintiffs, who
remained anonymous for their own protection, alleged that placement
of blacks in classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR classes)
on the basis of I.Q. tests is a denial of equal protection.' The district
court, noting the presence of cultural bias4 in the I.Q. tests and the
great proportion of blacks in the EMR classes, 5 agreed with the plain-
tiffs and granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the use of I.Q.
tests as the primary standard for placement in EMR classes or for re-
evaluating those already placed in EMR classes. 6 At the same time the
court denied plaintiffs' request for a mandatory injunction "requiring the
defendants to take affirmative action to compensate black students who
have been wrongfully placed in EMR classes at some time in the past."'7
Plaintiffs had sought supplemental education for those students whose
progress had been hindered by erroneous placement in EMR classes,
hiring of black psychologists to insure that blacks were judged fairly,
and establishment of a ratio limiting the percentage of blacks allowable
in EMR classes. 8
Judge Peckham found that wrongful placement of students in
EMR classes warranted injunctive relief. He said, "[E]ven if a stu-
dent remains in an EMR class for only one month, that placement is
1. The phrase "ability grouping" refers to the practice of dividing students
according to their measured ability to learn at a certain level.
2. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3. In support of this allegation, plaintiffs further alleged that I.Q. tests were the
primary standard used to place children in these classes, that many blacks scored low
because of the cultural bias present in the test itself, and that as a result of this er-
rondous placement, these students were being deprived of an equal educational oppor-
tunity. Id. at 1308.
4. The phrase "cultural bias" refers to that factor present in certain tests that
causes a particular child to perform poorly on the test because of his cultural or
environmental background.
5. The complaint alleged that while only 28.5% of all students in the school
district were black, 66% of all students in EMR classes were blacks. 343 F. Supp. at
1311.
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noted on his permanent record, his education is retarded to some de-
gree, and he is subjected to whatever humiliation students are exposed
to for being separated into classes for the educable mentally retarded."9
The most important question before the court was whether blacks
were being wrongfully placed in EMR classes in violation of their rights
to equal protection. At this point the court made a significant pro-
cedural decision. The traditional equal protection test places the bur-
den on the plaintiff to show that no rational relationship existed between
the method of classification used and the resulting classification.10
Judge Peckham rejected this traditional test and ruled that the burden
of persuasion would be shifted to the defendants on the establishment
of a prima facie case by the plaintiffs." Consequently, the plaintiffs
needed only to show that the I.Q. tests resulted in a racial imbalance
and the court would shift the burden of persuasion of a rational re-
lationship to the defendants."2
The court relied on analogous cases in the areas of employment
discrimination,' 3 jury selection,' 4 and school desegregation 5 to support
this shift. In addition to these lines of case law, Judge Peckham de-
lineated three policies behind the shift: 1) shifting the burden of proof
is a reflection of the strong judical policy against racial discrimina-
tion;16 2) in a racial discrimination case there is sometimes said to ex-
ist an affirmative duty to implement integration in certain of our
institutions;' 7 and 3) an empirical assumption that native intelligence
is randomly distributed among the population and that if an uneven
classification on that basis is found, it is probably due to discrimina-
tion.' s
9. Id. at 1308. Plaintiffs' evidence consisted of the results of standard I.Q.
tests administered by black psychologists with special emphasis on reducing the cul-
tural bias in the test through the acceptance of non-standard answers and through
rewording of some of the questions that tended to show that plaintiffs were mentally
retarded. Id. Plaintiffs' irreparable injury allegedly flowed "from plaintiffs' place-
ment in EMR classes because the curriculum is so minimal academically, teacher ex-
pectations are so low, and because other students subject EMR students to ridicule
on account of their status." Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1311.
12. Id.
13. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14. Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
929 (1972).
15. United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 404
F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
16. 343 F. Supp. at 1309.
17. Id. at 1310.
18. Id.
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The court found that the statistical evidence alleged by plaintiff
was sufficient to establish a racial imbalance. To establish the second
element of their prima facie case, that I.Q. tests were the primary de-
terminant in placement, plaintiffs relied mainly on the finding of Hob-
son v. Hansen10 that I.Q. tests influence all of the other evaluations of a
student made by school officials. Teacher evaluation was shown in
Hobson to be especially tainted by knowledge of a student's I.Q. score.20
In finding that the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case of
discrimination, the court relied on the influence argument of Hobson
as well as language in the Education Code21 stating that other evidence
must "substantiate" the I.Q. score before a student could be placed
in an EMR class.22
Once the burden of proving rationality had shifted to them, de-
fendants argued that the racial imbalance was not a result of the tests
or that the tests, though racially biased, were still rationally related to
the classification because they were the only means of classification
available. 23  The court made quick work of these arguments dismiss-
ing the first by observing that defendants had failed to produce any
supporting evidence in its favor and dismissing the second by alluding
to alternative methods of placing mentally retarded students in prac-
tice in New York and Massachusetts.24
After this dismissal of defendants' arguments, the court granted
the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs but rejected their
other claims for mandatory relief in order to give defendants flexibility
in formulating a corrective plan.25  The narrow holding of the case was
that the use of I.Q. tests as the primary basis for placing black stu-
dents in classes for the educable mentally retarded that results in a
significant racial imbalance in such classes is a denial of equal protec-
tion. This result was based on the absence of any evidence to establish
19. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969).
20. Id. at 484.
21. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.085 (West Supp. 1973).
22. 343 F. Supp. at 1312. The court also found that the use of I.Q. scores by
parents in signing required consent forms tainted the consent features of the Code so
as to make the consent not a truly voluntary one. The court found that parents were
overawed by the seemingly scientific significance of the LQ. scores. Id. at 1313.
23. Id. The defendants also argued that the racial imbalance resulted from the
"location of EMR classes in predominantly black schools prior to desegregation" and
because more white parents of mentally retarded children put their children in private
schools than did black parents of mentally retarded children. Id.
24. Id. The court cited the use of achievement tests and teacher evaluation in
New York and the Massachusetts requirement of "psychological assessment." Both of
these districts exclude the use of group I.Q. tests. Id. at 1314,
25. Id. at 1314-15.
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that I.Q. tests were culture free21 or that a reasonable rationale for
the use of the present culturally biased text existed. Since defendants
failed to carry their burden of proof/persuasion by producing evidence
to show that the tests were culture free, the result might conceivably
be different in future cases in which defendants are more diligent.
The question treated by the federal district court has never reached
the Supreme Court, but it has been treated extensively by at least one
other district court and incidentally by several other courts.2r The
right of school districts to separate students on the basis of learning
ability was recognized in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Ed-
ucation.28  In Jones v. School Board 9 assignments were made to par-
ticular schools on the basis of I.Q. scores. The court held that this use
of I.Q. tests was not unconstitutional per se; however, this standard
must be "properly applied".8" The court also stated that the school
district could not consider racial factors in making assignment deci-
sions. In contrast to P. v. Riles, the Jones court left the burden of proof
of the issue of rational relationship on the plaintiff.3'
In Miller v. School District Number 2 32 the issue of ability group-
ing was also raised. In that decision the district court explained that its
primary concern was to prevent racial discrimination and that "the
practice of separating study groups or classes into accelerated or slow
sections is a matter for educators. '33
Both of these earlier cases treated the use of I.Q. tests incidentally
in the context of broader school desegregation questions. These courts
were more concerned with the achievement of integration within a
school district and the avoidance of blatant discrimination in school at-
tendance than with unintentional intra-school segregation of the type
resulting from the use of I.Q. tests in class placement. Ability group-
ing was regarded as an educational tool to be employed at the discre-
tion of those in charge of operating the school system.' Their decision
26. A culture free test is one that lacks the elements creating cultural bias.
See generally P. Pascale, The Impossible Dream: A Culture-Free Test, 1971 (pub-
lished on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 054 217).
27. See text accompanying notes 28-33 and 45-49 infra.
28. 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958) (dictum), aff'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
"Pupils may, of course, be separated according to their degree of advancement or
retardation, their ability to learn . . . ." Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271
(5th Cir. 1957), quoted, 162 F. Supp. at 378.
29. 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
30. Id. at 75.
31. Id. at 77.
32. 256 F. Supp. 370 (D.S.C. 1966).
33. Id. at 375.
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was final so far as the courts were concerned as long as race was not
a criterion in placement. They seemed to have been unaware of the
possibility of having de facto segregation arising totally from the use of
I.Q. tests themselves.
The argument that discrimination might arise from the cultural
bias of I.Q. tests finally emerged in the first extensive judicial treat-
ment of ability grouping. Judge Skelly Wright wrote at length on this
problem in Hobson v. Hansen in 1967. In the context of a major at-
tack on segregation in the District of Columbia's school system, plain-
tiffs attacked the use of a track system by local school authorities that
divided pupils into four tracks ranging from "basic' to "honors" based
primarily on comparative I.Q. scores. The school officials acknowl-
edged that the track system was developed as a "response to problems
created by the sudden commingling of numerous educationally re-
tarded Negro students with the better educated white students."8 4
Judge Wright found that the "effect of this separation would be to insu-
late the more academically developed white student from his less for-
tunate black schoolmate, thus minimizing the impact of integration
. . ,,5 Despite no evidence of an intentional violation, the court
held that the use of I.Q. tests to support a track system was a violation
of equal protection since these tests were standardized on a white middle
class level and thus were discriminatory against blacks.30 To imple-
ment this conclusion, the court ordered the abolition of the track sys-
tem.3
7
Judge Wright seemed especially concerned over the substantial
risk that the intelligence of black children would be underestimated by
the I.Q. tests and thus they would be undereducated.3 8  The lack of
flexibility in the system, the lack of movement upward, and the lack of
any attempt to supplement the education of those blacks who were be-
hind weighed heavily in the decision. A parallel concern of the court
in Hobson was that in an urban school system blacks and whites though
going to school together were not being taught together because of
the track system.8 9 Judge Wright seemed to be saying that integrated
classrooms as well as integrated schools were needed to insure that
blacks actually received an equal educational opportunity.
34. 269 F. Supp. at 442.
35. Id. at 443.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 517.
38. Id. at 489.
39. Id. at 443.
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The court in Hobson applied the traditional equal protection test
of rationality.40 It has been pointed out, however, that "the court
seems to apply a standard less permissive than the rationality test."'41
Although Judge Wright only hinted at the application of a compelling
state interest test,42 that seems to be what he applied. 3 This more
stringent test is derived from the constitutionally suspect classification
of race.44 Judge Wright placed the burden of proof on this issue on
the defendants, and the court in P. v. Riles followed his example.
Following Hobson, other courts have seized on its reasoning in de-
ciding de facto segregation cases. In Graves v. Walton County Board
of Education"0 a federal district court in Georgia issued an injunction re-
quiring defendants to "provide remedial education programs which
permit students attending or who have previously attended segre-
gated schools to overcome past inadequacies in their education."46 In
a recent decision from a federal district court in North Carolina, the
judge described the duty on local school boards "as not simply a neg-
ative duty to refrain from active legal racial discrimination, but a
duty to act positively to fashion affirmatively a school system as free as
possible from the lasting effects of such historical apartheid."4  In
that case, however, the court sanctioned a division of students into
study groups based on achievement in a particular course even though
evidence showed that there was a high percentage of blacks in the
"slow" and "regular" sections.4 8 The court declared that it was an ed-
ucational matter whether ability grouping was allowed in a particular
school system.
From these scattered opinions, it is difficult to ascertain any com-
mon standard. The court in P. v. Riles relied only on Hobson in mak-
ing its decision. Judge Peckham drew from Hobson the shifting of the
burden of proof49 as well as the realization that testing could lead to
40. Id. at 511.
41. Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, 81 HIv. L. REv. 1511, 1519 (1968).
42. This test is applied in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 630 (1969). The Supreme Court decided that for a suspect classification to be
upheld it must "promote a compelling state interest." Id.
43. See 269 F. Supp. at 513; Note, 81 HA~v. L. Rnv., supra note 41, at 1519-20.
44. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
45. 300 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 410 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 200.
47. Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1363
(W.D.N.C. 1969).
48. Id. at 1367.
49. See note 62 infra.
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de facto segregation within a school. He did not seem as concerned,
however, over the use of ability grouping or the lack of supplemental
programs for deprived blacks as Judge Wright was. The main goal of
all courts dating from the original desegregation decision ° has been
to provide the black with an equal educational opportunity. One com-
mentator has rephrased this goal: "In a broad sense probably the most
important idea underlying the entire push for school desegregation, de-
jure and de facto, is the possibility of developing greater intellectual
and other competence in Negro children who are looked upon as cul-
turally deprived."- 1 The implementation of this goal has raised several
questions for the courts in relation to the use of I.Q. tests for ability
grouping.
Educational theorists are themselves not in agreement on the
answers to such questions as: 1) is ability grouping educationally use-
ful?52 2) are I.Q. tests accurate standards for placement in ability
groups?" and 3) are varying results on I.Q. tests by race due entirely
50. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Punke, Competence as a Basis of Student Assignment, 32 ALA. LAw. 24, 40
(1971).
52. See generally M. Bryan, Ability Grouping: Status, Impact, and Alternatives,
June 1971 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog
no. ED 052 260); D. Esposito, Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Grouping: Princi-
pal Findings and Implications of a Re-search of the Literature, July 1971 (pub-
lished on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 056
150).
53. Several educational theorists have written that I.Q. tests are accurate pre-
dictors of academic achievement. See V. Bennett, Intelligence Testing in the Schools,
1970 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no.
ED 045 708); V. Bhushan, Comparison of IQ and Socioeconomic Index in Pre-
dicting Grade Point Average, Mar. 6, 1970 (published on microfiche by Educ. Re-
search Information Center, catalog no. ED 039 304); D. Goslin, The Social Conse-
quences of Predictive Testing in Education, May 1965 (published on microfiche by
Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 018 219); Hughson, The Case for
Intelligence Testing, in CONTEMPORARY IsSUES IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 366
(1970). However, other theorists have denied that I.Q. tests are useful for any pur-
pose. See L. Barrit, Intelligence Tests and Educationally Relevant Measurements,
Sept. 1, 1967 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog
no. ED 016 255); R. Nichols, Implications of Racial Differences in Intelligence for
Educational Research and Practice, Feb. 6, 1969 (published on microfiche by Educ.
Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 033 179); Yourman, The Case Against
Group IQ Testing, in CONTEmPORARY IssuEs IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 371 (1970).
There does seem to be a general agreement that I.Q. tests do not measure innate
learning potential. See Garcia, IQ-The Conspiracy, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept.
1972, at 40; Mercer, IQ-The Lethal Label, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1972, at 44.
For a summary of American attitudes toward I.Q. tests, see 0. Brim, Experiences and
Attitudes of American Adults Concerning Standardized Intelligence Tests, 1965 (pub-
lished on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 018 209).
For the effect of tester's attitude on I.Q. test results, see J. Jacobs, Expectancy and
Race: Their Influences upon the Scoring of Individual Intelligence Tests, Mar. 14,
1570 [Vol. 51
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to environmental factors?54 These conflicts make the legal determi-
nations on these issues more difficult. As for the first question,
the courts seem willing to allow the decision of local educators to con-
trol. The courts found the second and third questions to be central to
a decision on de facto segregation claims in Riles and Hobson. The
failure of defendants to provide the court with an adequate answer
to these questions ultimately decided Riles against them. Their best
possible argument, one that defendants failed to make, was presented
by Kenneth Eells in a well-known article on cultural bias in I.Q. tests.55
Eells has suggested that if what is wanted from I.Q. tests is a good
prediction of how well a child will do in school, then cultural bias is a
necessary element of these tests.56 The school system as it now ex-
ists bases judgments of a student's progress on a white middle-class
standard, the same one on which I.Q. test results are based. Most edu-
cators feel that used for this limited purpose, I.Q. tests are excellent
instruments.r Problems arise when people look on these tests as meas-
ures of some innate ability and not of present ability to achieve on a
certain level.5 Even when I.Q. tests are used for this limited pur-
pose, however, the results can be disastrous for the child involved.
Teachers tend to look at a low I.Q. score as signifying a child with
limited educational potential when, the child, especially if he is black,
possibly has a deprived educational background.59 As a result of
this attitude on the part of teachers, the child begins to view himself as
incapable of learning and begins to perform at a low level.6 0 This re-
1972 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no.
ED 068 529); Watson, IQ-The Racial Gap, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1972, at 48.
54. A recent article by Arthur Jensen suggests that racial differences in I.Q.
scores are not due to cultural bias, but rather to genetic differences between blacks
and whites. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement, 39
HARv. EDUC. REv. 1 (1969). All that can be definitely said about this theory is
that it is extremely unpopular. See E. Epps, Race, Intelligence, and Learning: Some
Consequences of the Misuse of Test Results, Aug. 1970 (published on microfiche by
Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED 048 423); E. Gordon, Jensenism:
Another Excuse for Failure to Educate, Sept. 1969 (published on microfiche by
Educ. Research I formation Center, catalog no. ED 037 519). Not enough evidence
exists on either side to make a definite decision, as Jensen readily admits. See
generally A. Jensen, Intelligence, Learning Ability, and Socioeconomic Status, Feb. 8,
1968 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research Information Center, catalog no. ED
023 725).
55. Eells, Some Implications for School Practice of the Chicago Studies of
Cultural Bias in Intelligence Tests, 23 HARv. Enuc. REV. 284 (1953).
56. Id. at 293.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 294.
59. 343 F. Supp. at 1312-13; Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 489 (D.D.C.
1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969).
60. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 484 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed,
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suit could be avoided by renaming the tests and by expressly limiting
their function to prediction of academic performance.01 Thus, a
strong argument can be constructed in defense of the cultural bias pres-
ent in the I.Q. tests now used.
The Riles decision does little to advance the legal answers to the
questions posed above. The failure of the defendants to bring forth
their strongest potential argument prevented the court from analyzing
the varying educational theories. One significant result of the decision
is that the court showed no inclination to extend Hobson into a re-
quirement that classes be integrated. Ability grouping was not abol-
ished, and although the court noted the need for a supplemental sys-
tem to aid culturally deprived blacks, it did not require that the school
system implement one.
Riles can be fairly characterized as a retreat from the far-reaching
possibilities of Hobson. The wide leeway allowed the defendants to
perfect a remedy is a strong indication that this court considered edu-
cators better able to settle the questions raised by the use of I.Q. tests
in ability grouping than the courts. An inference can be drawn that
as long as educators operate in good faith and on reasonable grounds,
the courts will not interpose their own system of classroom division.
This inference draws support from the retreat from a compelling state
interest requirement in Hobson to a rational relationship requirement in
Riles. This retreat was authored despite the presence of the suspect
classification based on race. Thus the decision is at best inconsistent
with the main line of equal protection cases. Judge Peckham's de-
cision not to apply the compelling state interest test can only be attrib-
uted to some unarticulated policy reason, for modem legal precedent
does not support him.6 2
393 U.S. 801 (1969); Eells, supra note 55, at 295. This theory is referred to as the
self-fulfilling prophecy. See R. Rosenthal, PYGMAmON IN Tm CLASSROOM (1968);
J. Evans, Interpersonal Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Further Extrapolations from the
Laboratory to the Classroom, 1969 (published on microfiche by Educ. Research In-
formation Center, catalog no. ED 034 276); Rosenthal, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1968, at 44. Contra, E. FLEmING, Teacher Expectancy or
My Fair Lady, Mar. 5, 1970 (published in microfiche by Educ. Research Information
Center, catalog no. ED 038 183).
61. Eells, supra note 55, at 295.
62. This retreat is unusual in that the Supreme Court has used the compelling
state interest test frequently in modem decisions when faced with cases of prima facie
denials of equal protection involving suspe.ct categories, of which race is the leading
one. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Hobson the compel-
ling state interest test was followed when the court considered the de facto inter-school
segregation charges. 269 F. Supp. at 506. But when the Hobson court considered
the challenge to the track system, it purported to use the rational relationship test.
[Vol. 511572
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This area of the law must necessarily remain unsettled until the
larger questions of inter-school integration are answered. When issues
such as busing are finally laid to rest, the Supreme Court may choose to
advance further in this field by putting a premium on protection of the
individual child's learning experience. Any system relying on testing
will make errors in placement from time to time. Whether the judicial
system will choose to tolerate these mistakes as incidental to the bene-
fits derived from an objective standard of placement remains for the
future.
JACK THORNTON
Constitutional Law-A New Constitutional
Right To An Abortion
The controversy concerning legalized abortion has been active in
the United States for almost twenty years. The medical profession, leg-
islators, and the judiciary have wrestled with the legal, moral, and so-
cial conflicts involved in the abortion issue. Recently in Roe v. Wade1
and a companion case2 the United States Supreme Court determined that
the right of privacy inherent in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protected a woman's right to choose whether or not to
Id. at 511. It is unclear why such a distinction is drawn, in Hobson (in form) and in
Riles (in fact), when all the classifications are based on race. The present test for
testing the constitutionality of ability grouping therefore appears to be the rational
relationship test and not the compelling state interest one.
1. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
2. Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973). The decision is important apart from
Wade because Bolton involved an attack on a relatively liberal abortion law adopted by
Georgia in 1968, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (1972). The Court determined that in
spite of the liberal nature of the statute it nevertheless could not stand in view of the
standards established in Wade. The statute established certain procedural require-
ments that must be met before an abortion could be performed. These included re-
quirements that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Com-
mittee on Accreditation of Hospitals; that the operation be approved by the hospital
staff abortion committee; and that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed
by independent examinations of the patient by two other licensed physicians. The
Court held these requirements unconstitutional as having no rational relation to the
statute's purposes, as being unduly restrictive of the patient's rights already safe-
guarded by her physician, and as being an undue infringement on the physician's
right to practice. The statute's residency requirement was found to violate the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the Constitution by denying protection to persons
entering Georgia for medical services.
1973] 1573
